We propose an integral Nash equilibrium seeking control (I-NESC) law which steers the multi-agent system composed of a special class of linear agents to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium in noncooperative strongly monotone games. First, we prove that there exist parameters of the integral controller such that the system converges to the Nash equilibrium in the full-information case, in other words, without the parameter estimation scheme used in extremum seeking algorithms. Then we prove that there exist parameters of the I-NESC such that the system converges to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium in the limited information case where parameter estimation is used. We provide a simulation example that demonstrates that smaller perturbation frequencies and amplitudes are needed to attain similar convergence speed as the existing state-of-the-art algorithm.
INTRODUCTION
Extremum seeking control is a class of data-driven, adaptive control techniques used in optimization problems where the cost is a function of the states of a dynamical system. The method is a zero-order method which means it only uses the value of the cost function for optimization and no a priori knowledge of the cost function is needed, except for some basic assumptions.
The method was first proposed in [Leblanc [1922] ]. For many years there was no analytical proof of stability of extremum seeking control for general nonlinear systems until the paper [Krstić and Wang [2000] ]. This sparked renewed interest into further development of this type of control. Most of the research was based on the original paper by Krstić and Wang, e.g. [Tan et al. [2006] ], [Ghaffari et al. [2012] ], etc. There were also methods based on different ideas, such as [Dürr et al. [2013] ], where the authors proposed an extremum seeking scheme based on Lie algebra, which turned out to be equivalent to the Krstić-Wang scheme. Based on the parameter estimation scheme from [Adetola and Guay [2007] ], Guay and Dochain propose an extremum seeking scheme [Guay and Dochain [2017a] ] which does not use singular perturbation and averaging theory. As a result, a faster convergence rate is obtained. This fact motivates further research on such type of extremum seeking controller.
Although very similar at a first glance, Nash equilibrium problems (NEP) are different from standard (distributed) optimization problems, as they are characterized by a number of selfish agents whose goal is to optimize their individual cost functions, each possibly dependent on the certain conditions on the individual cost functions, will converge to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium for general nonlinear agents. In [Liu and Krstić [2011] ], it is proven that the use of stochastic perturbation signals also admits the convergence to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium. The authors in [Poveda and Teel [2017] ] propose a framework for synthesis of a hybrid controller which could also be used for NEPs with nonlinear agents. All of the mentioned extremum seeking controllers are based on [Krstić and Wang [2000] ].
Contribution Motivated by the recent research interest in NEPs, we adapt the extremum seeking controller proposed in [Guay and Dochain [2017a] ], [Guay et al. [2018] ]. Specifically, our contributions are the following:
• We extend a known proportional-integral extremum seeking control scheme to strongly monotone NEPs for a multi-agent linear systems and we prove a practical convergence to a Nash equilibrium. • We numerically observe an improved performance with respect to [Frihauf et al. [2011] ], as smaller amplitudes and frequencies of the sinusoidal perturbations signals are needed for a comparable rate of convergence.
Notation R denotes the set of real numbers. For a matrix A ∈ R n×m , A and A denote its transpose and maximum singular value respectively. For vectors x, y ∈ R n , x y and x denote the Euclidean inner product and norm, respectively. Given N vectors x 1 , . . . , x N , possibly of different dimensions, x := x 1 , . . . , x N and for each i = 1, . . . , N , x −i :=
x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x N . diag (A 1 , . . . , A N ) denotes the block diagonal matrix with A 1 , . . . , A N on its diagonal. For a function v : R n × R m → R differentiable in the first argument, we denote the partial gradient vector
, . . . , ∂v(x,y) ∂x N ∈ R n . For a maping v : R n → R m , we denote the set of zeros as zer(V ) := {x ∈ dom(A)|0 m ∈ V (x)}.
PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a multi-agent system with N agents indexed by I = {1, 2, . . . , N }, each with the following dynamics:
Let us also define n := n i , n −i := j =i n j and m := m i .
Standing Assumption 1 (Regularity)
For each i ∈ I, the function h i in (1b) is differentiable in x i and its partial gradient ∇ xi h i is Lipschitz continuous in x i and x −i . 2
A common assumption amongst the extremum seeking literature (for example [Krstić and Wang [2000] ], [Guay and Dochain [2017a] ], [Poveda and Teel [2017] ]) is the existence of the steady-state mapping, which tells us to which state(s) the system converges when a constant input is applied. For our subsystems (1a), for each i ∈ I, there exists a mapping
such that for every i ∈ I,
Let us also define
In this paper, we assume that the goal of each agent is to minimize its own steady-state cost function, i.e., min
which depends on the inputs of some other agents as well. From a game-theoretic perspective, we consider the problem to compute a Nash equilibrium (NE).
In plain words, a set of inputs is a NE if no agent can improve its steady-state cost function by unilaterally changing its input.
Since for all i ∈ I, the steady-state cost functions are differentiable in u i , it follows from Theorem 16.3 in [Bauschke et al. [2011] ] that a collective vector u * is a NE if and only if ∇ ui h i π i (u * i ), π −i (u * −i ) = 0. (6) In view of (6), we can stack all of the partial gradients into a single vector and form the so-called pseudo-gradient mapping of the steady-state cost functions:
Therefore, by (6) and (7), we note that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of the game in (5) is equivalent to finding u * such that F (u * ) = 0, which is the problem of finding a zero of F in (7), u * ∈ zer(F ).
A relatively standard assumption in modern game theory literature [Yu et al. [2017] ], [Yi and Pavel [2019] ] is strong monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient:
Standing Assumption 2 (Strong monotonicity) The mapping F in (7) is strongly monotone, i.e.,
for all (u, v) ∈ R 2m , for some µ > 0.
Let us also define the pseudo-gradient with respect to x of the cost functions
We note that, in general, monotonicity of the pseudogradient of the cost function F x (x) does not imply monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient of the steady-state cost function F (u).
INTEGRAL NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING CONTROL
In this section, we propose two control schemes for Nash equilibrium seeking. The first one is designed for the full-information case. In other words, agents have perfect information of the actions of other agents and some additional information which will be described in more detail in the next subsection. The second is data-driven, i.e. designed for the case when the agents have access to the cost output.
Full-information case
In the simplest case, we assume that every agent knows the analytic expression of its partial gradient and has access to the inputs of the other agents. The integral Nash equilibrium control in the next subsection will approximate the gradient and inputs of the other players and use the approximations in the same control law as the full-information case. Our proposed control law is inspired by the extremum seeking control in [Guay and Dochain [2017a] ], [Guay et al. [2018] ]:
or in collective vector forṁ
where B := diag(B 1 , . . . , B N ) and τ := diag(τ 1 , . . . , τ N ). Unlike [Guay and Dochain [2017a] ], we do not use the proportional part, as it does not help with the convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Theorem 1. (Convergence to Nash equilibrium). Consider the multi-agent system with dynamics (1a) and control law in (10)-(11) and let (x(t), u(t)) be its closed-loop solution. Let the Standing Assumptions hold. Then, there exists τ * such that if min i∈I τ i ≥ τ * , then the pair (x(t), u(t)) converges to (x * , u * ) = (π(u * ), u * ), where u * is a Nash equilibrium of the game in (5). 2
Proof. See Appendix A.
Limited information case
In the limited information case, we consider that the agents have access to the cost output. We emphasize that they neither know the actions of other agents, nor they know the analytic expressions of their partial gradients. This is the standard setup used in extremum seeking ( [Krstić and Wang [2000] ], [Guay and Dochain [2017a] ], [Poveda and Teel [2017] ] among others).
The extremum seeking control proposed by [Guay and Dochain [2017a] ] assumes that the cost function of the system has a strong relative degree of value one. This means that the first derivative of the cost function has a direct influence on the input to the system. In the case of multi-agent systems, where the cost functions do not depend only on the states of their agent but also of the others, we make an analogous assumption:
Assumption 1 (Degree of the output)
Let us first evaluate the derivative of the cost functions:
and introduce the following variables:
The variable θ 0 i measures the effect of the autonomous dynamics of agent i on its cost function and the effects of inputs of the other agents. The variable θ 1 i measures the effect of the input of agent i on the cost output y i . By substituting the previous variable definitions into (12), the derivative of the cost output reads aṡ
Note that θ 1 i is proportional to the right-hand side in (10). To estimate the local θ 0 i and θ 1 i , we use a time-varying parameter estimation approach such as the one proposed in [Guay and Dochain [2017b] ]. Let us provide a basic intuition. Letŷ i andθ i be estimations of the output y i and the variable θ i respectively and let e i = y i −ŷ i be the estimation error. Then, the estimator model of (15) for agent i is given bẏ
where K i is a free design parameter. Note that the first two terms on the right-hand side resemble high gain observer schemes. As the structure of the problem does not allow the use of high gain observers, it is necessary to introduce some other dynamics into the estimation. This is the primary role of the third term in (16). Therefore, the dynamics of c i (t) are choosen aṡ
The original parameter estimation law in [Adetola and Guay [2008] ] was designed for constant parameters, therefore η i =η i and was fully known. For time-varying parameters, we still want to use η i , but the additional term −c iθ does not allow for its calculation, since the rate of change of the parameters is unknown. This is why the estimateη i is used in the parameter estimation law. It is also necessary to define a symmetric, positive definite scaling matrix variable Σ i ∈ R mi+1×mi+1 with dynamics given bẏ
where k i , σ i and α i 1 are free design parameters. We note that, originally, in [Adetola and Guay [2008] ],Σ i = c i c i , but this proved to be inconvenient in practical implementations, as the elements of Σ i grow unbounded. Instead, as in (19), dynamics of Σ i behave as a first-order system. The third term is added so that the matrix is always invertible.
Equations (16)-(19) form the parameter update law presented in [Adetola and Guay [2008] ]:
where Π Θi (θ, v) denotes the projection of the vector v onto the tangent cone of the set Θ i atθ, as defined by Equation 2.14 in [Nagurney and Zhang [2012] ]. This implies that if the starting valueθ i (0) is in Θ i , so willθ i (t) for all t.
We are finally ready to propose an integral decentralized Nash equilibrium seeking control law of the form ∀i ∈ I :
together with Equations (16)-(20). In the collective vector form, Equation (21) read as
As in [Guay and Dochain [2017a] ], for the parameter estimation scheme to converge, a persistency of excitation (PE) assumption for every agent is introduced.
Assumption 2 (Persistence of excitation) For every i ∈ I, there exist constants α 2 i and T i such that
where c i (τ ) is the solution to (17). 2
We conclude the section with the main theoretical result of the paper, namely, the convergence of the closed-loop dynamics to a Nash equilibrium of the game. Theorem 2. (Convergence to Nash equilibrium). Consider a multi-agent system with dynamics (1a) and control law (16) -(20), (21), for all i ∈ I and let (x(t), u(t)) be its closed-loop solution. Let the Standing Assumptions and Assumptions 1, 2 hold, let π be the steady-state mapping in (2) and let D be the largest amplitude of the perturbation signals {d i (t)} i∈I . Then, there exist gains (K i , k T i , σ i ) i∈I and τ * such that if min i∈I τ i ≥ τ * , then the pair (x(t), u(t)) converges towards the O(D 2 ) neighborhood of some (x * , u * ) = (π(u * ), u * ), where u * is a Nash equilibrium of the game in (5).
2
Proof. See Appendix B.
SIMULATION EXAMPLE
Consider a system with three agents i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, having dynamics:ẋ
The cost functions of agents are given by 
Two types of controllers were simulated to have a comparison; the limited information controller proposed by this paper and the controller proposed in [Frihauf et al. [2011] ] with additional low-pass and high-pass filters as in [Krstić and Wang [2000] ] in order to improve the performance. The latter can be described by the following equationsη
(26) For our controller, the following parameters were chosen: σ 1 = σ 2 = σ 3 = 10 −6 , K 1 = K 2 = K 3 = 50, k 1 T = k 2 T = k 3 T = 50, α 1 I = α 2 I = α 3 I = 0.1, τ 1 = 5, τ 2 I = 10, τ 3 I = 15, d 1 (t) = 1 2 sin (40t), d 2 (t) = 1 2 sin (50t) and d 3 (t) = 1 2 sin (60t). Initial states of x,û, c, θ and η were set to zero. The parameters K, k T and τ I were initially chosen large enough to ensure stability. Then τ I was decreased to speed up the convergence. Further decreases in τ I were making the states oscillate; further decreasing of K and k T did not improve the performance of the algorithm. For the Frihauf et al., the following parameters were chosen: ω 1 h = 180, ω 2 h = 200, ω 3 h = 220, ω 1 l = 45, ω 2 l = 50, ω 3 l = 55, ω 1 = 90, ω 2 = 100, ω 3 = 110, k 1 = k 2 = k 3 = 0.5 and A 1 = A 2 = A 3 = 5. The parameters were experimentally chosen in such a way that a fast convergence rate is obtained without increasing the amplitude of the sinusoidal perturbations to unreasonable values.
The results of the numerical simulations can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 . While the convergence speed of both algorithms is similar, the frequency and amplitude of the sinusoidal perturbation signals are much lower with our I-NESC law.
We remark that the proportional-integral extremum seeking control in [Guay and Dochain [2017a] ] is capable of achieving a faster convergence speed than the algorithm in [Krstić and Wang [2000] ]. Our I-NESC algorithm has slower convergence compared to [Guay and Dochain [2017a] ] because of the lack of the proportional part in the control law. Although for optimization problems it can greatly improve convergence speed, we observed that for NEPs even small proportional gain may cause instability.
CONCLUSION
Nash equilibrium problems can be solved by an extremum seeking algorithm if the agents belong to a certain class of linear dynamics with strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous game mapping. Extension to general linear or nonlinear systems and the extension to constrained states and inputs, is left for future work.
Appendix A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove the theorem, it is necessary to show that our subsystems, which under constant inputs stabilize to some equilibrium points, will not become unstable when a timevarying input is applied. Additionally, it is necessary that our collective input u converges to the Nash equilibrium u * . First, we will describe the behaviour of the subsystems to time-varying inputs.
Stability of equilibrium points π i (u i ) for every agent i ∈ I can be characterised by the following Lyapunov function:
where β > 0. The derivative of (A.1) is equal tȯ
2) Note that if u i is constant (u i = 0), equilibrium point π i (u i ) is uniformly globally exponentially stable (UGES).
For very slow changes of the input u i , we expect the subsystems will converge to a small neighborhood of equilibrium points π i (u i ), while for fast changes of the input u i , we do not. We consider the controller in (11). Its goal is to both estimate the Nash equilibrium input u * and to preserve the stability of the subsystems. Therefore, we construct the following Lyapunov function candidate:
Now, we bound the derivative of T . By adding and subtracting F (u) to (11),u reads aṡ
(A.6) As u * ∈ zer(F ), we have F (u * ) = 0, thus (A.6) reads as
(A.7) To bound the second term in (A.5), we use the following identity:
(A.8) By using the relations (7), (9) and (A.8), it follows that:
B F x (π(u)) = F (u).
(A.9) By exploiting (A.7) and (A.9), from (A.5) we havė
Since all of the functions are Lipschitz continuous, the right-hand side in (A.10) can be upper bounded as follows:
where L > 0 is the Lipschitz constant of the mapping B • F x . Now, we turn our attention to the full Lyapunov function candidate W . The derivative of W can be now bounded aṡ
To complete the proof, we bound the derivative of V caused by the change of inputs: −β(x − π(u)) Bu ≤ β B u x − π(u) .
(A.13) By using (A.4), the norm of the derivative is bounded:
Again, since all of the functions are Lipschitz continuous, the right-hand side of the previous equation can be bounded as follows
where L F > 0 is the Lipschitz constant of F . By using the bounds (A.13) and(A.15),Ẇ can be bounded as follows:
then the matrix M in (A.17) is positive definite, which in turn implies that the Lyapunov derivativeẆ is negative definite, which concludes the Lyapunov argument and in turn the proof.
Appendix B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof is similar to the full-information case proof, but unlike the full-information case, our inputs use the estimation of the θ i variables, which affects stability. Let us consider a Lyapunov function candidate of the form 
Parameter estimation scheme
We bound the time derivative of the W function similarly to [Guay and Dochain [2017b] ] and [Guay et al. [2018] ] with the only difference that we let each agent choose their own parameters (σ i , K i , k T i ). The Lyapunov derivative reads as follows:Ẇ
and σ := max i σ i .
Local state-input Lyapnuov function
As stated in the previous section ((A.1) and (A.2)), equilibrium points π i (u i ) are UGES when a constant input is applied. Stability of equilibrium points π i (û i ) for timevarying inputs, for every agent i ∈ I can be characterised by the following Lyapunov function:
The derivative of the Lyapunov function
(B.7) Note that the derivative has three addends; the first one is equal to the complete derivative of the Lyapunov function in the case of constant inputs, the amplitude of the second component is proportional to the amplitude of the perturbations and the amplitude of the third component is equal to the amplitude of the derivative of the input u i .
To bound the third component, we need to boundu i , hencė u, which reads aṡ
(B.8) By using the same argument as in (A.15), it follows thaṫ
By using the previous equation, it is possible to bound the second addend in (B.7):
Therefore, the derivative of V can be bounded aṡ
(B.11) The last term can be bounded by using Cauchy-Bunyakovsky-Schwarz inequality to obtaiṅ
Finally, the last two non-quadratic terms can be bounded with the inequality x y ≤ 1 2k x 2 + k 2 y 2 to finally conclude the desired bound:
Nash equilibrium estimation error The use of parameter estimation also has an influence on the Nash equilibrium estimation error. The derivative of (B.4) is equal tȯ
(B.14) By the same method as in (A.11), (B.13), it follows thaṫ
The full Lyapunov candidate Now, with the bounds (B.5), (B.12) and (B.15), the time derivative of the full Lyapunov candidate function is bounded as follows:
We are left with determining bounds on θ and θ . Since all of the considered functions (and their composition) in (1a), (13), (14) and (22) are Lipschitz continuous, it follows that 
(B.19) The task at hand now is to prove that there exist parameters K, k T and τ min such that the right-hand side in (B.19), apart from the term with d(t) 2 , is always negative definite. The proof goes by the same lines as in [Guay and Dochain [2017b] ], [Guay et al. [2018] ]. Consider the following reformulation of (B.19):
(B.21)
The parameter k 3 can be chosen arbitrarily, while k 5 has to be chosen such that lower diagonal element in M is positive, i.e. 2µ − 1/k 5 > 0. Also, in order for M to be positive definite, the following condition must be satisfied 
(B.24) The parameters σ, k c must be chosen small enough, while k 4 must be large enough such that the following equations hold true:
The parameter σ is a free design parameter; the parameter k c can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the gains K and k T (or to be more precise K i and k T i , see [Guay and Dochain [2017b] ] for more details). The parameter k 4 can be arbitrarily chosen. Therefore, it is possible to choose the controller parameters σ, k T and K such that all of the constants that multiply the squares of the norms in (B.20) (except for d(t)) are positive. Next, we consider the Lyapunov functions of the subsystems in (B.6), the bounds on matrices Σ i and the quadratic elements of the Lyapunov function candidate L. Let D be the largest amplitude of all the perturbation signals d i (t). Then it can be concluded that there exists a positive constant α L such that:
With z = η,θ, x,ũ ∈ R N × R m+N × R n × R m , let us define the set Ω γ = {z | L(z) ≤ γ} . (B.27) We choose γ such that z ∈ Ω γ ⇒θ ∈ Θ 1 × Θ 2 × · · · × Θ N .
(B.28)
It then follows that the trajectoriesη,θ, x,ũ enter the set
Therefore, for D chosen such that Ω γ0 ⊂ Ω γ , the set Ω γ0 , which is contained in a ball containing the point (0, 0, x * , 0) with radius of order O D 2 , is exponentially stable for the closed-loop system .
